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The Impact of Continuous Training 





Keeping up with rapid technological change necessitates constant innovation. Successful 
innovation depends on both incumbent workers’ knowledge, based on experience, and 
knowledge about the latest technologies, along with the skills needed to implement them. 
Both of these knowledge-based elements of innovation can be attained through moderate 
labor force turnover in combination with continuous training. Based on German micro data, 
we find empirical evidence in support of training leading to innovation within a multivariate 
regression framework. However, when instrumenting training by the existence of a union’s 
contract or a works council this impact disappears. 
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In the contemporary knowledge-based society, the production of new knowledge has usurped 
the place of traditional production, which is based on labor and capital. Romer (1986), in 
looking for an explanation for ongoing and endogenous growth, was the first to formalize the 
idea that an existing knowledge stock provides the basis for further knowledge production and 
thus  innovation,  or,  in  other  words,  today’s  researchers  “stand  on  the  shoulders”  of 
predecessor  researchers.  Increasingly  intense  competition  due  to  globalization,  along  with 
rapid technological change make constant innovation the only way to stay competitive. This 
holds at both the national level (Aghion et al. 2005) as well as at the firm level. Aghion et al. 
(2006) present a model where incumbent firms who fail to innovate on a regular basis are in 
danger of being evicted from the market by new entry. Accordingly, incumbents have to “use 
innovation as the main battle weapon with which they protect themselves from competitors 
and with which they seek to beat those competitors out.” (Baumol 2002, p. 2). We extend this 
idea by arguing that if innovation is the weapon, education and, especially, training are the 
ammunition that render it useful and effective. 
Our argument is grounded in Becker’s (1964) fundamental theory on training and takes into 
consideration  extensions  of  that  theory  by  Acemoglu  and  Pischke  (1999).  All  of  these 
previous approaches have one thing in common: they assume an environment where price 
competition determines the incentive to invest in training. If the firm can appropriate parts of 
the future rent that results from a worker’s increased productivity, it will invest in procuring 
that productivity. However, according to Schumpeter (1942), price competition is only one 
part of the story of rent distribution. Another and important part has to do with how these 
rents are created in the first place and to understand this, one must take into consideration the 
entire innovation “lifecycle”—from the birth of a new idea to its commercialization. We argue that innovation is the only way to prevent entry and/or beat out the competitors 
(Aghion et al. 2006). Incumbents must innovate in order to stay at the leading edge of the 
technology frontier, which is where market leaders can expect monopoly (or oligopoly) rents 
as a way of reimbursing them for the R&D and training costs that made their advantage 
possible. However, fierce competition at the technology frontier means that small weaknesses 
and  failures  can  be  a  matter  of  life  and  death,  a  situation  that  inhibits  incumbents  from 
undertaking risky and adventuresome innovation. Instead, they rely on routinized innovations, 
which do not come out of thin air. Rather, they encompass building on existing but still fairly 
recent knowledge and further improving and extending it (Baumol 2002a). Eventually, the 
routinization  of  innovation  results  in  a  firm-internal  knowledge  stock  comprised  of  both 
knowledge  gleaned  from  former  experience  (as  embodied  in  the  workers)  and  the  latest 
technological knowledge and skills. However, such a valuable knowledge stock can only be 
achieved by means of moderate turnover in the labor force along with continuous training so 
that skills will be commensurate with the latest technology. Accordingly, we assume that 
firms operating successfully at the technology frontier and innovating constantly must rely on 
continuous training, that is, training is a necessary condition for successful innovation. 
To test this hypothesis empirically, we employ German micro-level panel data provided by 
the Institute for Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung). In a 
multivariate  regression  framework,  we  find  evidence  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that 
continuous  training  has  a  positive  effect  on  a  firm’s  ability  to  innovate.  However,  when 
instrumenting training by the existence of a union contract and a works council the positive 
effect of continuous training on a firm’s innovations disappears. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  focuses  on  our  idea  that 
escaping  competition  by  way  of  innovation  is  a  sound  explanation  for  firm-sponsored 
training. Section 3 introduces our empirical method for testing the hypothesis that training influences innovation; Section 4 describes our data; and Section 5 presents the findings. We 
draw conclusions in Section 6, along with a few ideas for further research. 
2. Training and Innovation 
In his fundamental works on human capital, Becker (1964) emphasizes the importance of on-
the-job training to a person’s productivity over the lifetime. He argues that firms will only 
invest in specific training if they can appropriate the future rent of training. Motivated by first 
empirical  findings  by  Steedmann  (1993)  and  also  Krueger  (1993)  and  Autor  (2001), 
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) extend Becker’s argumentation and argue that noncompetitive 
labor  markets,  in  combination  with  a  compressed  wage  structure,  can  also  provide  an 
incentive  for  firm-sponsored  general  training  because  firms  can  appropriate  parts  of  the 
expected rent.
1 Both arguments appear to concentrate on the appropriability of future rents 
from the workers’ increased productivity by employing a model of price competition in which 
firms compete over the future distribution of a given pie. However, according to Schumpeter 
(1942, p. 85), “it is not the kind of [price] competition which counts but the competition for 
the  new  commodity,  the  new  technology,  the  new  source  of  supply,  the  new  type  of 
organization (the largest-scale unit of control for instance)—competition which commands a 
decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the 
outputs of the existing firms, but at their foundations and at their very lives.” Against this 
background, price competition is only one chapter in the story of the distribution of expected 
rents from training. How the rents are created in the first place is another important chapter, 
and to understand it, it is necessary to consider the innovation process, a process that involves 
                                                 
1 Possible explanations for a compressed wage structure include transaction costs, such as search and matching 
fictions (Mortensen 1982; Diamond 1982); asymmetric information about the worker’s true level of training 
(Katz and Zidermann 1990; Chang and Wang 1996); asymmetric information about an applicant’s—particularly 
a young applicant without a comprehensive work record—motivation to apply for a new job (Is the applicant one 
of  low  ability  who  has  been  fired  from  a  previous  job  or  is  he  or  she  an  underpaid  high-ability  worker?) 
(Acemoglu and Pischke 1998a); complementarities between the training of specific and general skills (Acemoglu 
and Pischke 1998b); and given labor market institutions such as minimum wages or labor unions (Acemoglu and 
Pischke 1998b, 1998b, 2003; Freeman and Medoff 1984). the  necessity  of  continuous  investment  in  knowledge  production  and  hence  training  for 
effective competition in the marketplace. 
We extend this idea by arguing that training enables workers to experiment with the latest 
technologies in such a way that something new is created. Initially, this contributes to the 
firm’s  overall  knowledge  stock.  A  firm’s  knowledge  stock,  in  turn,  is  the  basis  for  the 
production of new knowledge and, eventually, the entire innovation process—from the birth 
of  a  new  idea  to  its  commercialization  as  a  novel  product  or  procedure.  The  general 
importance of constant innovation is described by Aghion et al. (2006) in a model where 
technologically advanced entry creates a competitive environment that forces incumbents to 
innovate  constantly.  In  this  environment,  each  potential  entrant  arrives  with  leading-edge 
technology. If the incumbent is less technologically advanced, the entrant will replace the 
incumbent.  If  the  incumbent  is  also  employing  leading-edge  technology,  it  can  use  its 
reputation  advantage  and  block  entry.  In  short,  an  incumbent  who  is  approaching  the 
development of leading-edge technology has a strong incentive to innovate and to keep pace 
with  technological  progress  as  doing  so  can  prevent  entry  of  competitors.  However,  an 
incumbent whose technology is out of date—regardless of whether it innovates—will find it 
difficult to keep pace with technological progress and, presumably, will not be able to prevent 
entry of leading-edge competitors. Consequently, an incumbent who lags considerably behind 
the times in terms of technology is discouraged from innovating and will be forced out of the 
market. The main implication of this model is that the threat of technologically advanced 
entry (escape-entry effect) or of competition in an oligopolistic market (escape-competition 
effect)  encourages  innovation  by  incumbents  who  are  already  in  place  at  the  technology 
frontier (Aghion et al. 2001, 2005). Innovation is the incumbent’s weapon against entry and 
competition; training is the ammunition. Taking  a closer look  at the innovation process itself, Baumol (2002)  points out that in a 
competitive  environment  where  firms  do  not  dare  to  relax  their  innovative  activities, 
innovation has to become a routinized process. In the process, “business firms systematically 
determine the amounts they will invest in the R&D process …, who and how many will be 
employed for the purpose and even select what it is that the company’s laboratories should 
invent. In sum, competition makes it too risky for firms to depend primarily for their new 
products and processes on the unpredictable efforts of independent inventors. Instead they 
have  changed  much  of  the  economy’s  R&D  into  an  internal,  bureaucratically  controlled 
process” (2002, p.2). In this situation, incumbent firms are likely to rely on their existing 
knowledge stock as the basis for further improvements and extensions. However, the firm’s 
knowledge stock is comprised of more than just codified knowledge, i.e., patents and how-to 
manuals. An equally, if not more so, important component of the knowledge stock is tacit 
knowledge, i.e., know-how and know-who (Lundvall and Johnson 1994). Know-how, which 
is  gained  from  former  experience,  and  know-who,  which  arises  from  social  contacts,  are 
“sticky” types of knowledge, meaning that they are “stuck” to the person in possession and 
cannot be created artificially or bought by employing new workers. This type of knowledge is 
the product of an evolutionary process in which colleagues have worked together in teams and 
know about the strengths and weaknesses of each other, leading to complementarities that 
raise productivity per se. Furthermore, previous experience with development processes and 
related problems can be relied on to avoid difficulties in further exploitation of the existing 
knowledge stock (see Nelson and Winter 1982). 
Thus, high turnover in the workforce is likely to destroy the social ties that can increase 
productivity. However, according to Granovetter (1973), closed networks have their dangers, 
too, including the risk of inflexibility and decrepit structures that can result from a lack of 
“new blood.” In this context, training, along with moderate labor force turnover, provides a 
simple way to collect new knowledge and thus prevent inflexibility and blindness that are inherent in decrepit structures, both of which are major obstacles to innovation. We thus argue 
that a sustainable company’s decision to invest in training does not depend on whether it can 
recoup training costs by paying noncompetitive wages and/or instituting a compressed wage 
structure. Rather, firms have an incentive to pay at least competitive wages to preserve the 
tacit part of their knowledge stock and, at the same time, they have an incentive to invest in 
training as a way to extend the codified part of the knowledge stock and keep up with the 
latest  technological  changes  and  requirements.  Given  an  incumbent  firm’s  reliance  on 
experience,  continuous  training  of  the  routinized  workforce  is  a  necessary  investment  to 
steadily refresh the firm’s knowledge stock that, in turn will provide the basis for further 
innovation. 
In the following sections, we empirically test the hypothesis that continuous training has a 
significant impact on a firm’s innovative ability and thus its competitiveness.  
3. Method 
To test the hypothesis of whether continuous training supports firm innovations, we define a 
binary  variable,  continuous  training,  that  takes  the  value  1  if  a  firm  regularly  trains  its 
employees and 0 otherwise; the variable for innovation is also binary and takes the value 1 if 
a firm was innovative in a specific year and 0 otherwise. 
To reduce potential problems of endogeneity in our model, we use a twofold strategy: First, 
we lag the training variable and do not consider training at a single year but instead we focus 
on  the  continuity  in  training,  i.e.  on  those  establishments  that  trained  their  employees 
continuously during the whole period of observation. This strategy helps us to reduce the 
problem  of  reverse  causality,  i.e.  a  firm  trained  its  employees  because  of  an  innovation 
requiring  new  skills  of  the  firm’s  workforce.  However,  this  strategy  will  not  help  us  to 
overcome the problem of reverse causality in the case of a firm that continuously innovates. To control for the latter case we add the lagged innovation variable in our estimation model. 
The effects of continuous training on the firm’s propensity to innovate (INNO) are estimated 
in a probit model while controlling for specific firm-level and industry-level characteristics 
with e1 as an error term. 
( ) 1   , stics characteri   level industry    and    level   firm    training, continuous     1    I   :   INNO e     (1) 
Angrist (2001) suggests to use simple linear identification strategies when estimating causal 
effects  even  though  the  dependent  variable  is  a  0-1-dummy  variable.  Therefore,  we 
additionally use a linear probability regression to estimate the effects of continuous training 
on  a  firm's  propensity  to  innovate  while  controlling  for  firm-level  and  industry-level 
characteristics. 
Although  we  control  for  a  lot  of  firm-level  and  industry-level  characteristics  in  our 
multivariate  regression  framework,  we  still  worry  about  an  omitted  variable  bias.  An 
instrumental variable approach where continuous training is instrumented by variables that 
can explain training but do not correlate with the error term of the innovation equation could 
help us to overcome this problem. In the instrumental variable approach, we focus on the 
variation in continuous training activities induced by the instruments and analyze whether this 
variation can explain a firm's propensity to innovate. 
When  looking  at  the  determinants  of  training,  we  find  two  variables  that  seem  to  be 
interesting instruments, namely the existence of a union contract and the existence of a works 
council. It has been found in empirical studies that these institutions do not have a direct 
impact  on  innovation  (cf.  Schnabel  and  Wagner  1994;  Addison  et  al.  2004)  but  heavily 
determine  a  firm’s  decision  to  train  (Bellmann  and  Leber  2005;  Neubäumer  and  Kohaut 2008).
2  Therefore,  union  contracts  and  work  councils  might  influence  a  firm's  innovative 
ability indirectly by encouraging training activities. When reading through various German 
union  contracts,  one  notices  that  the  vast  majority  of  these  contracts  include  sections  on 
qualification and training of employees (Bispinck 2000). Unfortunately, these regulations and 
recommendations are so diverse and different from each other that it is not possible to make 
them  comparable  by  categorization.  Concerning  the  impact  of  work  councils  on  training, 
§§ 96-98 of the German Works Council Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) give 
information that work  councils are legally entitled to foster and take part in the decision 
making process on training activities of the employees. Thus, the existence of union contracts 
and works councils might have a positive impact on a firm's innovative activities simply by 
encouraging  training  of  the  employees.  To  analyze  this  line  of  causality,  we  use  an 
instrumental variable approach, where continuous training is instrumented by the existence of 
a union contract and a works council. Doing this, we focus on the variation in continuous 
training  activities  induced  by  the  existence  of  these  institutions  and  analyze  whether  this 
variation can explain a firm's propensity to innovate. 
Both the continuous training and the innovation variable are binary variables. Therefore, we 
would  use  nonlinear  probit  models  to  analyze  the  determinants  of  a  firm's  propensity  to 
innovate and to train continuously. Thus, continuous training is the independent variable of 
the  innovation  probit  model  and  the  dependent  variable  of  the  second  probit  model,  i.e. 
continuous training is endogenized in this system of equations. However, nonlinear models 
cannot be solved in a two-stage instrumental variable framework. A feasible way to handle 
this problem is a recursive bivariate probit model where the error terms of the two probit 
                                                 
2 Addison (2005) gives an overview over the empirical literature on the impact of works councils on German 
firm performance and shows that most of the studies focus on productivity effects, either in terms of sales or 
value added. Some studies find that works councils influence training/innovative work practices and thereby 
have an indirect impact on productivity. However, little is said about the direct or indirect impact of works 
councils on a firm's product innovations. 
 models are allowed to be correlated (Evans and Schwab 1995). In this seemingly unrelated 
bivariate  probit  model  the  probit  equations  on  training  and  innovation  are  estimated 
simultaneously.  
( ) 1   , stics characteri   level industry    and   level   firm    training, continuous     1    I   :   INNO e     (2) 
( ) 2   , stics characteri   level industry    and   level   firm   council,    works contract, union      1    I   :   CONTRAIN e
                        (3) 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] r = = = 2 1 1 2 , cov ; 2 var ; var   ; 0 e e e e e E e E i             (4) 
Following Angrist (2001), we alternatively estimate an ordinary instrumental variable two-
stage least squares regression (i.e. a linear probability model), where innovation is used as a 
dependent variable and the regressor, continuous training, is instrumented by the existence of 
a union contract and a works council. 
4. Data 
Information  on  innovative  activities,  continuous  training  and  additional  firm-level 
characteristics is generated from the IAB establishment panel (Betriebspanel), waves 1997–
2001. Data access was provided via on-site use at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the 
German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) 
and/or remote data access. For a detailed description of this data source see Bellmann (2002). 
Access to the data was granted during a research period at the Research Data Centre of the 
Federal  Employment  Agency  at  the  Institute  for  Employment  Research  (FDZ)  and  via 
controlled  data  teleprocessing  at  the  FDZ.  As  the  name  establishment  panel  implies,  the 
establishment, and not the company, constitutes the unit of measurement. Thus, we have two 
categories  of  entities:  firm  headquarters  and  subsidiaries.  Both  are  treated  equally  in  the following analysis. Businesses contained in the German Social Insurance Statistics form the 
population  of  the  IAB  establishment  panel.  The  businesses  are  selected  according  to  the 
principle of optimum stratification of the random sample. Because the stratification cells are 
defined by business size categories and industries, these dimensions must later be included in 
the econometric estimations to ensure representative results. The establishment panel data 
comprise  the  results  of  annual  surveys  of  businesses  that  have  been  carried  out  in  West 
Germany since 1993 and in East Germany since 1996. The annual surveys cover questions on 
a series of firm characteristics. Additional complexes of questions dealing with special topics, 
such as working time flexibility, elder employees, or innovative activities, are included in 
selected annual catalogues. 
To analyze the impact of continuous training on a firm’s ability to innovate, we use data for 
the period 1997–2001. Only those businesses that answered the questionnaire in every year of 
this period are included in our dataset.  Furthermore, the whole public sector is excluded, 
resulting in a balanced panel of 3,198 private-sector businesses for the period 1997–2001. 
This represents a uniquely rich source of data for our analysis. 
The panel data are transformed into cross-section data by defining variables that span more 
than one year. Information on innovative activities is available for the years 1998 and 2001. 
In  these  years,  the  firms  were  asked  whether  they  introduced  a  completely  new 
product/service during the past two years, whether they newly adopted a product/service, or 
whether they enhanced an existing product/service. Strictly speaking, only the answer to the 
first  question  (introduction  of  a  completely  new  product/service)  can  be  called  a  true 
innovation. However, for our analysis, innovation is more broadly defined and the variable 
innovation is given a value of 1 if a firm carried out any of the above-mentioned innovative 
activities; 0 otherwise. Since firms are likely to rely on their existing knowledge stock as a basis  for  further  improvements  and  extensions,  the  information  on  whether  a  firm  was 
innovative in 1998 is expected to be an important determinant of innovative ability in 2001. 
Information on training is drawn from the 1997, 1999, and 2000 surveys. The interviewed 
firms  were  asked  whether  or  not  training  for  their  employees  was  encouraged  either  by 
(partly) financing the training or by releasing the employees from work. The question referred 
to the first half of every year. If a firm promoted training, tr, in all the years t, the variable 
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Information on various firm-level characteristics is available from the establishment panel and 
is introduced in our model in the form of control variables. The number of employees is used 
to capture firm-size effects. More specifically, 10 firm-size classes were generated according 
to the average number of employees in the period 1997–2000. Then, the logarithm of this 
categorical variable was taken to create the firm-size variable used in the model. Thus, the 
subproportional path of the logarithmic function can be maintained for more establishments, 
with  the  last  firm-size  class  including  all  establishments  with  2,000  or  more  employees. 
Further characteristics of a firm’s employment structure include the average fraction of skilled 
employees, the average fraction of unskilled employees, and the average fraction of part-time 
employees,  again  for  the  period  1997–2000.  Furthermore,  the  variable  labor  turnover  is 
generated to measure employment fluctuations at the firm-level. Following Neubaeumer and 


















lt , where net is the number of new employees in year t, det is the number of dismissed employees 
in t, and aet is the number of all employees in year t. Moreover, several dummy variables are 
introduced to inform about other firm characteristics. Among them are variables that take on 
the  value  1  if  the  firm  invested  in  information  and  communication  technologies  or  in 
production technologies in at least one year between 1997 and 2000; otherwise 0. Another 
binary variable encodes information on whether a firm undertook any organizational changes 
in 1998; the question on reorganization activities was not included in the 1997 catalogue. 
Firms with their own research and development departments might be more innovative and 
offer more training than other firms, all other factors being equal, and we thus introduce a 
research  and  development  dummy  that  takes  the  value  1  if  the  establishment  itself  or  an 
affiliate  had  a  research  and  development  department  in  1998.  The  technical  condition  of 
firm’s machines is also captured by a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the machines were 
considered cutting-edge or modern, and 0 if they were considered middle-aged or old, in 
1997. The variable union contract was originally meant to take the value 1 if a firm had a 
labor agreements with unions from 1997 until 2000, with firms not continuously tied to union 
contracts as a reference group. However, Neubaeumer and Kohaut (2008) note that in this 
establishment  panel,  a  skip  in  the  dummy  variable  union  contract  over  the  years  almost 
exclusively  appears  temporary,  at  least  for  the  period  from  2001–2005.  Therefore,  they 
suggest  transforming  this  variable  when  using  it  as  a  variable  that  spans  several  years. 
Consequently, our union contract variable takes on the value 1 if the establishment was tied to 
a union contract for at least three years between 1997 and 2000. Information on the existence 
of  works  councils  is  not  available  for  all  establishments  during  the  whole  period  of 
observation; however, these data are available for the years 1998 and 2000. We took data 
from these two years to create a variable that is given the value 1 if a works council existed in 
both years and 0 otherwise. A final firm-level dummy variable is used to capture the age of the firm and is 0 if the firm was established before 1990 and 1 if it was established in 1990 or 
later. 
To  capture  time-invariant  industry-level  effects,  industry  dummy  variables  distinguishing 
between  23  private-sector  industries  are  introduced.  Furthermore,  a  West/East  Germany 
dummy,  as  well  as  the  logarithm  of  the  ratio  employees  versus  whole  population  of  an 
administrative district (German Kreis), are used to represent specific regional effects, i.e., 
agglomeration economies. The regional employment data are derived from the German Social 
Insurance Statistics and were merged with the establishment panel. A detailed description of 
the structure of establishments contained in our generated dataset, e.g., distribution of the 
firms over the private-sector industries or over the firm-size  classes, can be found in the 
Appendix. 
Table 1 provides statistics on continuous training and innovative activities by industries. The 
propensity  to  continuously  train  employees  varies  across  the  industries.  It  appears  to  be 
common practice for energy/mining/water supply, chemical industry/petroleum processing, 
shipbuilding/aircraft construction, and credit institutions to train their employees; however, 
only  a  few  firms  in  agriculture/forestry,  wood  working,  building  industry,  or 
restaurants/accommodation services engage in continuous training. Altogether, 42 percent of 
the surveyed establishments stated that they offered continuous training for their employees. 
Industry-specific  differences  are  also  apparent  when  it  comes  to  innovative  activities. 
Chemical industry/petroleum processing, plastics/rubber industry, electrical engineering/data 
processing  machines,  and  shipbuilding/aircraft  construction  are  the  most  innovative. 
Agriculture/forestry,  the  building  industry,  real  estate  services,  and 
restaurants/accommodation services seem to be rather conservative in this regard. In total, 41 
percent of the interviewed firms engaged in innovative activity between 1999 and 2001. Table 1: Continuous training and innovative activities across industries 
No Yes Total No Yes Total
Agriculture and forestry 131 25 156 133 23 156
83.97 16.03 100.00 85.26 14.74 100.00
Energy, mining, water supply 12 71 83 55 23 78
14.46 85.54 100.00 70.51 29.49 100.00
Chemical industry, petroleum processing 7 43 50 12 39 51
14.00 86.00 100.00 23.53 76.47 100.00
Plastics, rubber industry 16 12 28 / 26 /
57.14 42.86 100.00 / / 100.00
Earths, stones and fine ceramics industry 37 26 63 25 38 63
58.73 41.27 100.00 39.68 60.32 100.00
Iron, steel and metal industry 37 58 95 37 59 96
38.95 61.05 100.00 38.54 61.46 100.00
(Light) Metal construction 71 110 181 57 125 182
39.23 60.77 100.00 31.32 68.68 100.00
Electrical engineering, data processing machines 40 77 117 26 90 116
34.19 65.81 100.00 22.41 77.59 100.00
Road vehicle manufacturing, garages 28 62 90 45 44 89
31.11 68.89 100.00 50.56 49.44 100.00
Shipbuilding, aircraft construction / 11 / 0 11 11
/ / 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00
Fine mechanics, toys industry 32 32 64 18 46 64
50.00 50.00 100.00 28.13 71.88 100.00
Wood working 59 10 69 42 27 69
85.51 14.49 100.00 60.87 39.13 100.00
Paper and printing industry 27 20 47 29 18 47
57.45 42.55 100.00 61.70 38.30 100.00
Textile industry 29 19 48 20 26 46
60.42 39.58 100.00 43.48 56.52 100.00
Food, beverages and tobacco industry 73 49 122 58 62 120
59.84 40.16 100.00 48.33 51.67 100.00
Building industry 318 109 427 329 95 424
74.47 25.53 100.00 77.59 22.41 100.00
Trade 359 193 552 362 181 543
65.04 34.96 100.00 66.67 33.33 100.00
Communications and information transmission 87 85 172 115 57 172
50.58 49.42 100.00 66.86 33.14 100.00
Credit institutions 6 92 98 28 70 98
6.12 93.88 100.00 28.57 71.43 100.00
Insurance industry 18 30 48 17 31 48
37.50 62.50 100.00 35.42 64.58 100.00
Real estate services 32 30 62 46 16 62
51.61 48.39 100.00 74.19 25.81 100.00
Restaurants, accomodation services 144 22 166 127 40 167
86.75 13.25 100.00 76.05 23.95 100.00
Other Services 267 174 441 288 148 436
60.54 39.46 100.00 66.06 33.94 100.00
Continuous training                                           
in 1997, 1999 and 2000
Innovation 1999-2001
 
Note: / signifies anonymized data 
Concerning  the  impact  of  continuous  training  on  a  firm’s  innovative  activities,  a  simple 
computation  of  the  relative  frequency  suggests  that  continuous  training  of  employees 
positively influences innovation activity. Table 2: Cross tables on continuous training and innovations across size classes 
 
No Yes Total
Total No 1,315 500 1,815
72.45 27.55 100.00
Yes 552 792 1,344
41.07 58.93 100.00
Total 1,867 1,292 3,159
59.10 40.90 100.00
1-4  No 80.31 19.69 100.00
Yes 75.00 25.00 100.00
Total    79.87 20.13 100.00
5-9 No 75.95 24.05 100.00
Yes 56.38 43.62 100.00
Total    71.98 28.02 100.00
10-24 No 71.79 28.21 100.00
Yes 54.81 45.19 100.00
Total    67.14 32.86 100.00
25-49 No 60.18 39.82 100.00
Yes 53.19 46.81 100.00
Total    57.46 42.54 100.00
50-99 No 61.49 38.51 100.00
Yes 46.06 53.94 100.00
Total    53.35 46.65 100.00
100-249 No 60.00 40.00 100.00
Yes 42.37 57.63 100.00
Total    47.43 52.57 100.00
250-499 No 69.70 30.30 100.00
Yes 34.59 65.41 100.00
Total    39.91 60.09 100.00
500-999 No 81.82 18.18 100.00
Yes 31.20 68.80 100.00
Total    35.29 64.71 100.00
1000-1999 No 75.00 25.00 100.00
Yes 17.14 82.86 100.00
Total    18.75 81.25 100.00
2000 and more No 0.00 100.00 100.00
Yes 11.27 88.73 100.00
Total    11.11 88.89 100.00
Avg no. of 
employees
Innovation 1999-2001 Continuous 
training
 
Table 2 shows that those establishments that continuously trained their employees during the 
period 1997–2000 exhibited more innovative activities from 1999 to 2001. While only 28 
percent of the establishments that did not continuously train reported innovative activities, 
this  number  more  than  doubles  and  rises  to  59  percent  for  the  establishments  that continuously train their employees. Even across the single firm-size classes, this correlation is 
confirmed, with the exception of the very big establishments. In this category, one firm did 
not train its employees but was an innovator, resulting in a 100 percent innovator rate among 
the firms that do not train continuously in this group. 
5. Results 
We estimate a nonlinear probit regression and a linear probability regression with innovation 
as  a  dependent  variable  that  signifies  whether  the  firm  undertook  any  kind  of  innovative 
activity between 1999 and 2001. As the main regressor of interest we use continuous training 
in 1997, 1999, and 2000. All models in this section are estimated using robust standard errors. 
Column 1 of Table 3 presents the results of the probit model. We find a positive influence of 
continuous  training  on  a  firm's  innovative  ability.  This  effect  shows  highly  significant. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that the existence of a union contract has no significant effect on 
innovation. This is exactly what we expected based on the empirical innovation literature (cf. 
Schnabel  and  Wagner  1994).  Similarly,  we  find  no  significant  direct  impact  of  a  works 
council  on  a  firm's  innovations.  Interestingly,  we  see  that  the  effect  of  labor  turnover  is 
positive, yet insignificant. The R²s and the Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistics confirm a sound 
fit of the model. Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistics are used instead of ordinary Pearson chi² 
statistics since the number of covariate patterns does not differ much from the number of 
observations  and  thus  an  ordinary  Pearson  chi
2  test  is  less  appropriate  (Hosmer  and 
Lemeshow  2000,  pp. 140–145).  Similar  results  are  obtained  with  a  linear  probability 
regression (cf. column 2 of Table 3). Table 3: Determinants of innovations: simple probit and OLS regressions 
Constant
Continuous training 1997,1999,2000
Log average number of employees 1997-2000
Average fraction of skilled employees 1997-2000
Average fraction of unskilled employees 1997-2000
Average fraction of part-time employees 1997-2000
Labour turnover 1997-2000
Investment in ICT 1997-2000
Investment in production technology 1997-2000
Organisational changes in 1998
R&D department in 1998
Technical condition of the machines in 1997
Union contract 1997-2000
Works council 1998-2000
Some innovation in 1998
Founding year
Log Average fraction of employees on population 1997-2001
West Germany
Industry dummies
Number of observations 2,911 Number of observations 2.921
Wald chi2 838.21 F(39,2881) 65.15
Prob > chi2 0.0000 Prob > F 0.0000
McFadden R2 0.2769 R-squared 0.3353
Count R2 0.771 Root MSE .40353
Adjusted Count R2 0.435

















































































In  Table  4,  we  focus  on  the  determinants  of  continuous  training.  As  expected,  both  the 
existence of a union contract and a works council exhibit a highly significant impact on a 
firm's propensity to train its employees continuously. This is true for the probit model (cf. 
column 1 of Table 4) as well as for the linear regression model (cf. column 2 of Table 4). The 
effect of a union contract and a works council on a firm's propensity to train continuously 
both prove to be significantly positive. The coefficients of the remaining control variables have  the  anticipated  signs.  Altogether,  the  models  yield  results  in  line  with  training 
estimations for single years (Bellmann and Leber 2005; Neubaeumer and Kohaut 2008).  
Table 4: Determinants of continuous training: simple probit and OLS regressions 
Constant
Log average number of employees 1997-2000
Average fraction of skilled employees 1997-2000
Average fraction of unskilled employees 1997-2000
Average fraction of part-time employees 1997-2000
Labour turnover 1997-2000
Investment in ICT 1997-2000
Investment in production technology 1997-2000
Organisational changes in 1998
R&D department in 1998
Technical condition of the machines in 1997
Union contract 1997-2000
Works council 1998-2000
Some innovation in 1998
Founding year
Log Average fraction of employees on population 1997-2001
West Germany
Industry dummies
Number of observations 2,946 Number of observations 2.946
Wald chi2 1083.56 F(39,2881) 139.09
Prob > chi2 0.0000 Prob > F 0.0000
McFadden R2 0.3873 R-squared 0.4334
Count R2 0.803 Root MSE .37441
Adjusted Count R2 0.534














































































We finally apply instrumental variable methods, in which continuous training is instrumented 
by the existence of a union contract and the existence of a works council. The results of the 
seemingly unrelated bivariate probit and the instrumental variable two stage least squares 
regressions are given in Table 5. Table 5: Determinants of innovations: IV regressions 
Constant -2.943752 *** -2.160794 ***
(.2881532) (.2512263)
Continuous training 1997,1999,2000 -.6696602
(1.284358)
Log average number of employees 1997-2000 .745593 *** .3412823
(.0840345) (.2682285)
Average fraction of skilled employees 1997-2000 .5045903 ** -.1902845
(.2362983) (.3122628)
Average fraction of unskilled employees 1997-2000 -.4251538 -.2954689
(.2643928) (.2733512)
Average fraction of part-time employees 1997-2000 -.1430111 -.5014293 ***
(.1767912) (.1774775)
Labour turnover 1997-2000 -.9732814 ** -.012486
(.4757306) (.6237438)
Investment in ICT 1997-2000 .2396861 *** .3678988 ***
(.0841535) (.0777456)
Investment in production technology 1997-2000 .2176261 ** .2749621 ***
(.0859474) (.0823245)
Organisational changes in 1998 .2353901 *** .3659975 ***
(.0695598) (.0647661)
R&D department in 1998 .2947368 *** .7174994 ***
(.0906598) (.0874922)
Technical condition of the machines in 1997 .2618671 *** .1006507
(.065783) (.1009749)
Union contract 1997-2000 .1996612 ** .0570874
(.0789156) (.1162302)
Works council 1998-2000 .5654541 *** .0840514
(.084387) (.317519)
Some innovation in 1998 .0925953 .6672616 ***
(.0662413) (.1324651)
Founding year -.0008548 .1327518 *
(.0724203) (.0696664)
Log Average fraction of employees on population 1997-2001 -.0027894 -.0656253
(.0943457) (.0812113)
West Germany .0766747 .1314749 **
(.0693011) (.0606143)
Industry dummies Yes Yes
/athrho
rho
Number of observations 2,921 Number of observations 2.921
Wald chi2(77) 3,039.72 F(39,2881) 66.39
Prob > chi2 0.0000 Prob > F 0.0000
Wald test of rho = 0 R-squared 0.3235
chi2(1) .321237 Root MSE .40694
Prob > chi2 0.5709 Hansen J statistic 
Likelihood Ratio test of rho = 0 chi2(1) 0.011
chi2(1) .918502 Prob > chi2 0.9156






































Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit estimation Instrumental variable regression
Independent Variable CONTINUOUS TRAINING INNOVATION 1999-2001 INNOVATION 1999-2001
 
As can be seen from Table 5, the coefficients for continuous training become negative in the 
innovation equations, although the p value shows that these effects are not significant. In 
both, the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model and in the linear instrumental variable 
model, continuous training loses its influence on a firm’s innovative activities when only 
using the variation in continuous training induced by unions and works councils. At the same 
time, the test of the joint influence of unions and works councils on continuous training at the 
first stage of the two stage least squares IV regression delivers an F value of 48.58. This 
proves  that  the  chosen  variables  are  strong  instruments  for  training.  The  Hansen overidentification test of the instruments confirms this finding. For the seemingly unrelated 
probit model, a Wald test as well as a Likelihood Ratio test show that the null hypothesis 
0 = r cannot be rejected (cf. Table 5). Yet, the result for continuous training is significantly 
different from zero in the univariate innovation probit model, whereas the bivariate probit 
estimation reports insignificant estimates for both the continuous training dummy and the 
correlation coefficient. This again hints at continuous training having no effect on innovation 
(Monfardini and Radice 2008). 
Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of the results, some variations of the models are estimated. Since the 
main  variable  of  interest,  innovation,  is  a  binary  variable  and  the  results  of  the  linear 
probability  models  qualitatively  show  the  same  results,  we  focus  on  variations  of  the 
presented probit models. 
First,  the  training  period  is  shortened  so  that  the  regressor,  continuous  training,  refers  to 
training in 1997 and 1999 with all other variables being equal. Thus, a better lag between 
training and innovation is created to counter the argument of reversed causality of training 
and innovation by yet another means. The resulting probit model does not differ substantially 
from the one reported above: Continuous training has a significantly positive effect on a firm's 
innovations. To further widen the lag between training and innovation is not recommended, 
since  that  would  imply  that  training  leads  to  innovative  activity  only  after  a  specifically 
defined period of time. 
Second,  the  probit  and  biprobit  models  are  estimated  with  a  slight  variation  of  the 
instrumental variable union contract. The variable is coded 1 only if the interviewed firm 
actually confirmed for every year between 1997 and 2000 that it was tied to a union contract. 
Again, the results do not differ considerably from the original models. Furthermore, we estimated separate regressions for specific firm size classes. The regressions 
for those establishments with a) less than 25 employees, b) 25 and more employees, c) less 
than  50  employees,  and  d)  50  and  more  employees  show  similar  characteristics  to  the 
regressions  presented  above.  Our  results  remain  robust.  However,  if  we  only  consider 
establishments with 100 and more employees, our instrument becomes weak since there is too 
little variation in the existence of union contracts among larger firms. 
In  another  specification  of  our  model,  we  use  data  from  the  German  Social  Insurance 
Statistics  to  generate  the  Herfindahl  index  of  concentration  as  computed  by  Schmalensee 
(1977), which considers the size distribution of sellers in a market and thus represents an 
alternative means of accounting for industry-level characteristics. This index is insignificant 
in the innovation equation when used together with the industry dummies. Without industry 
dummies, the Herfindahl index becomes significantly positive, which hints at more innovative 
activity in industries with less competitive pressure. A certain degree of concentration seems 
necessary to induce innovative activities. This finding is in line with Aghion et al. (2006), 
who argue that the opportunity for temporary rents in an imperfect goods market and, hence, 
competition,  stimulates  innovative  activity.  In  this  context,  a  high  level  of  concentration 
indicates  that  incumbents  are  constantly  innovating  and  thus  manage  to  prevent  entry. 
However, nothing can be said about potential competition caused by potential entries. Apart 
from  that,  we  obviously  face  endogeneity  problems  because  innovation  alters  the  market 
position of some firms. Thus, coefficients should be interpreted as no more than correlations. 
The  Herfindahl  index  also  has  a  positive  impact  in  the  training  equation,  which  is  only 
significant at a 10 percent level of significance when used together with industry dummies. 
These results confirm Acemoglu and Pischke (1999), in that some market power seems to be 
necessary to encourage firm-sponsored training. However, this finding is in disagreement with 
that of Autor (2001), who finds that the Herfindahl index and training are negatively correlated in 
U.S. temporary employment firms and therefore suggests that less competition reduces training. However,  also  in  this  specification  of  the  model,  our  findings  concerning  the  impact  of 
continuous training on innovation are left unchanged, though the results are not included in 
the reported tables. 
To apply yet another variable representing industry-level characteristics, we use the average 
entry rate per industry as a measure of competitive pressure. The entry rate is generated from 
data of the German Social Insurance Statistics and shows a significantly negative impact on 
innovation,  which  again  is  consistent  with  Aghion  et  al.  (2006).  New  entry  means  that 
incumbents  have  not  successfully  defended  their  market  position.  It  reduces  the  expected 
payoff from innovating and thus discourages innovation. However, these results should be 
interpreted tentatively due to potential endogeneity problems. The coefficients should at most 
be interpreted as correlations. Again, our findings as to the impact of continuous training on a 
firm’s innovative ability are confirmed. 
We also estimated the models for manufacturing industries only. Once more, similar results 
were  found.  However,  it  might  be  a  problem  that,  in  this  case,  the  existence  of  a  union 
contract is not an appropriate instrumental variable as it no longer has a significant effect in 
the training equation. 
Finally, we examine whether continuous training favors radical innovations, which, in our 
context,  means  the  introduction  of  completely  new  products  or  services.  A  binary-coded 
variable is generated that takes the value 1 only if the firm reported having undertaken such a 
“real” innovation in the period 1997–2001. The reference group is comprised of firms that 
introduced minor innovations during this same period, which, in this context, means imitation 
or enhancement of an existing product/service. Table 6: Determinants of radical innovations: simple probit and OLS regressions 
Constant
Continuous training 1997,1999,2000
Log average number of employees 1997-2000
Average fraction of skilled employees 1997-2000
Average fraction of unskilled employees 1997-2000
Average fraction of part-time employees 1997-2000
Labour turnover 1997-2000
Investment in ICT 1997-2000
Investment in production technology 1997-2000
Organisational changes in 1998
R&D department in 1998
Technical condition of the machines in 1997
Union contract 1997-2000
Works council 1998-2000
Real innovation in 1998
Founding year
Log Average fraction of employees on population 1997-2001
West Germany
Industry dummies
Number of observations 1.174 Number of observations 1.189
McFadden R2 0.0761 F( 39,  1149) 4.98
Count R2 0.815 Prob > F 0.0000
Adjusted Count R2 0.023 R-squared 0.0738
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It turns out that already in our simple multivariate regression framework continuous training 
cannot explain the success of the radical innovators. However, the existence of a research and 
development department still exhibits a strongly positive effect on radical innovations. We 
suggest that high qualified employees working in research and development are permanently 
confronted by new challenges and thus have to increase and adapt their existing knowledge 
stock all along. This kind of knowledge formation, however, might not appear in the survey 
answers of the training question. This might be the reason for training having no effect. Still, 
we  do  not  know  what  kind  of  knowledge  management  it  is  exactly  that  distinguishes 
successful from less successful research and development departments. 
Aside  from  a  research  and  development  department,  former  radical  innovations,  and investment in production technology, no significant independent variable can be found in the 
probit  model  as  well  as  in  the  linear  probability  regression  model  presented  in  Table  6. 
Obviously,  radical  innovations  are  caused  by  factors  other  than  the  factors,  which  are 
responsible for imitation or product/service enhancement activities. So far, we do not know 
more about these factors. Accordingly, the goodness of fit of these last models is called into 
question by the listed test statistics. 
6. Conclusion 
The  goal  of  our  paper  was  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  continuous  training  is  a  necessary 
condition for successful innovation. Following Aghion et al. (2006), we argue that innovation 
is the only way for a firm to prevent entry and overcome competition. Therefore, incumbents 
must innovate constantly if they do not want to risk losing their position in the market, along 
with  the  accompanying  rents.  However,  the  necessity  to  innovate  successfully  inhibits 
incumbents  from  undertaking  risky  and  adventuresome  innovations;  instead,  they  rely  on 
routinized innovation. This, in turn, creates a demand for a firm-internal knowledge stock 
comprised of knowledge based in former experience, which is embodied in the workforce, 
and  the  latest  technological  knowledge,  along  with  the  skills  necessary  for  its  successful 
implementation.  Ensuring  that  the  knowledge  stock  contains  appropriate  amounts  of  both 
types of knowledge can be achieved through moderate turnover in the labor force along with 
continuous training in the latest technology. Accordingly, we assume that firms operating 
successfully  at the technology  frontier and innovating constantly  must rely on continuous 
training because routinized innovations do not come out of thin air. 
Empirically,  we  test  our  hypothesis  that  continuous  training  supports  innovation  by 
employing German micro-level panel data. In a simple multivariate regression framework, we 
find  evidence  that  continuous  training  does  have  a  positive  effect  on  a  firm’s  innovative 
ability. In the case of radical innovation, we do not find this positive correlation. However, when instrumenting continuous training by the existence of a union contract and a works 
council, the positive impact of continuous training on innovation disappears, although both 
instruments prove to be valid. 
This  finding  can  be  interpreted  in  two  ways—both  having  important  policy  implications. 
First, the results can be interpreted in a way that continuous training does not have a positive 
impact  on  innovation.  This  interpretation  challenges  the  currently  prevailing  training 
programs such that politicians along with managers should think about a reconceptualization. 
Second, the results can be interpreted in a way that continuous training in general does have a 
positive impact on innovation; however, it is not the kind of training which is induced by 
union contracts and works councils that stimulates innovative activities. In this second case, 
apparently, the regulations and recommendations of unions and works councils encourage a 
sort of training which is on average not beneficial in terms of a firm's dynamic innovative 
activities. This raises the interesting questions: Do these institutions merely react passively to 
secure employment of the incumbent workers? How could these institutions act proactively in 
support of a firm's innovations? 
In a way, our results are unsatisfactory, as we can not answer the question whether there are 
kinds of training which are beneficial in terms of a firm’s innovative activities. What we can 
say is that it is obviously not the kind of training induced by union contracts and works 
councils. However, these results suggest the value of further study on the kind of training that 
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Appendix 1: Distribution of establishments across industries 
 
Industry Freq. Percent
Agriculture and forestry 156 4.88
Energy, mining, water supply 83 2.60
Chemical industry, petroleum processing 51 1.59
Plastics, rubber industry 28 0.88
Earths, stones and fine ceramics industry 63 1.97
Iron, steel and metal industry 96 3.00
(Light) Metal construction 182 5.69
Electrical engineering, data processing machines 117 3.66
Road vehicle manufacturing, garages 90 2.81
Shipbuilding, aircraft construction 12 0.38
Fine mechanics, toys industry 65 2.03
Wood working 69 2.16
Paper and printing industry 47 1.47
Textile industry 48 1.50
Food, beverages and tobacco industry 122 3.81
Building industry 427 13.35
Trade 552 17.26
Communications and information transmission 172 5.38
Credit institutions 98 3.06
Insurance industry 48 1.50
Real estate services 63 1.97
Restaurants, accomodation services 167 5.22














































Appendix 3: Summary descriptive statistics on dummy independent variables 
Independent variable Freq. Percent Independent variable Freq. Percent
Investment in ICT 1997-2000 No 727 22.84 Union contract 1997-2000 No 1,649 51.56
Yes 2,456 77.16 Yes 1,535 48.00
Total 3,183 100.00 Total 3,184 100.00
Investment in production  No 632 19.86 Works council 1998-2000 No 2,102 66.71
Yes 2,551 80.14 Yes 1,049 33.29
Total 3,183 100.00 Total 3,151 100.00
Organisational changes                No 1,142 36.06 Some innovation in 1998 No 1,615 50.74
Yes 2,025 63.94 Yes 1,568 49.26
Total 3,167 100.00 Total 3,183 100.00
R&D department in 1998 No 2,594 81.24 Founding year Before 1990 1,930 60.62
Yes 599 18.76 1990 or after 1,254 39.38
Total 3,193 100.00 Total 3,184 100.00
Middle/old 991 31.08 East or West Germany East  1,626 50.84
Cutting-edge/new 2,198 68.92 West 1,572 49.16
Total 3,189 100.00 Total 3,198 100.00






Appendix 4: Summary descriptive statistics on metric independent variables 
Independent variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average number of employees 1997-2000 3,198 277.6542 1,272.58 1 43,857.25
Average fraction of skilled employees 1997-2000 3,190 .6161419 .2607177 0 1
Average fraction of unskilled employees 1997-2000 3,190 .2100377 .2321988 0 1
Average fraction of part-time employees 1997-2000 3,151 .1366122 .1929663 0 1
Labor turnover 1997-2000 3,147 .0601174 .070666 0 .6428571
Average fraction of employees on population 1997-2001 3,195 .3300649 .1051249 .1131106 .8199473
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